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Abstract
This is a study of electronic voting, with emphasis on its implementation in the Republic of Ireland. We
place electronic voting in its historical context, and deﬁne the basic requirements for any voting system. We
examine remote electronic voting (REV) and kiosk voting – in particular the Nedap/Powervote system bought
by the Irish government – to see if they can meet those requirements. We were motivated by a concern that the
Nedap/Powervote system may not be a satisfactory solution to Irish electoral needs. Our conclusion is that while
an adequate electronic voting system is possible, Nedap/Powervote is not it.Introduction
“An observer of voting technology once remarked: ‘If
you think technology can solve our voting problems,
then you don’tunderstand the problemsand you don’t
understand the technology.’ ”
– Dr. Rebecca Mercuri, Oct 2002 [1]
The Irish government has already begun to intro-
duce an electronic voting system, stating that it will
be easier to use, give more accurate results, eliminate
spoiled votes, speed up the count, and modernise the
electoral system [2]. Unfortunately, this system has
been developed outside of the state, by a private com-
pany [3]. The wider computer science community
has not been consulted in the choice or development
of this system, and it has become apparent that there
are several reasons to be concerned about the system
chosen. There is no technical documentation regard-
ing the system widely available, and what is avail-
able was clearly written with the computer-illiterate
voter in mind [4]. The source code developed has not
been made available, and contact with Mr. William
Stapleton of the Franchise Section of the Department
of the Environment and Local Government (DoELG)
has conﬁrmed that even they do not have a copy.
The aims of this report are to present a list of cri-
teria that any electronic voting system must meet in
order to make it an acceptable replacement for our
current paper system, and then to demonstrate that the
Nedap/Powervote system currently being introduced
by the Irish government does not, in fact, meet those
criteria.
To begin, it is necessary to put electronic voting
in its historical context, both in terms of voting sys-
tems and technology. This will be followed with a
development and presentation of the requisite crite-
ria for any electronic system to ensure that it is at
least as trustworthy as the paper system it replaces.
Thirdly, an examination of Remote Electronic Voting
in relation to the criteria developed will be made, and
ﬁnally, we examine how a satisfactory kiosk voting
system could be developed to meet the criteria previ-
ously discussed.
Historical and
Philosophical Context
“‘Many forms of Government have been tried, and
will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one
pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. In-
deed, it has been said that democracy is the worst
form of Government except all those others that have
been tried from time to time.”
– Winston Churchill, Nov 1947
Democracy
We, in Ireland, live in a representative democracy.
This means that the citizens of Ireland govern them-
selves by electing representatives to make decisions
for them. From its origins in ancient Athens [5] to
its current incarnation, democracy has gone through
many changes. The number of people eligible to vote
in a modern democracy is much greater than in an-
cient Athens, and so democracy cannot be used here
in its original form. Not only are modern countries
larger than the Greek city states, but many more cat-
egories of people are allowed to vote. As a result,
gathering the electorate together for a discussion on
the topic at hand is no longer possible. Nor, indeed, is
allowing the whole electorate to vote on every issue.
This is why we have moved from direct democracy to
representative democracy.
However, the underlying principles that make
democracy better than “all those others that have been
triedfromtimetotime”remainintact. Theworditself
comes from the Greek words ‘demos’ meaning ‘peo-
ple’ and ‘kr´ atos’ meaning ‘authority’ [6], and is com-
monly deﬁned as meaning “government by the peo-
ple”. So, in a democracy the people make the deci-
sions, if not directly then through the representatives
they elect. This gives each voter a certain responsi-
bility to adhere to the decisions reached through the
democratic process [7]. It also gives citizens who are
eligible to vote a responsibility to exercise their fran-
chise, since they cannot complain about the result of
1decisions if theydid not use their opportunity to affect
them.
Manual Vote Collection
Of course, if an electorate is going to elect represen-
tatives, their decisions must be collected somehow. It
would be impractical to use the Athenians’ method
– dropping clay balls (the origin of the word ballot
[6]) into clay pots. And so we collect ballot papers,
on which voters indicate their preferences. One of
the major turning points in the development of mod-
ern democracy was the appearance in the 1850s of
the Australian ballot. This is the name given to stan-
dardised ballots, issued by the government, with the
names of all the running candidates already printed
on them. As we use them today, Australian ballots
allow us to separate the task of authenticating a voter
from the task of authenticating a vote. This means
that we can be sure that:
² only eligible voters vote,
² they only vote once, and
² all votes counted are valid votes.
All this can be achieved without allowing anyone to
see who made any particular vote. Through the use
of a polling station, we can protect against voter co-
ercion and veriﬁable vote sale. But the most impor-
tant aspect of our modern vote counting system is that
at no point in the vote collection and tabulation pro-
cess must we place our trust in an individual or small
group of individuals. At every stage independent ob-
servers and representatives of interested parties are
welcome to be present.
Electronic Vote Collection
This vote collection and tabulation process is, in fact,
fundamental to our democracy. A country which was
nominally democratic, but whose voting system was
controlled by the “Powers That Be”, might not be a
safe place to live. Electronic voting systems (EVS)
canthereforebeclassedasSafetyCriticalsinceaseri-
ous breach of their security could potentially put peo-
ple’s lives at risk.
In the past, it appears that governments worldwide
and their respective electorates have been quite con-
cerned with any changes implemented in their voting
systems. Unfortunately, this is not the case with the
switch from paper ballot voting to electronic voting
systems [8]. In the rush to appear technologically ad-
vanced, inadequate voting systems are being installed
and used. Signiﬁcant errors and failures in voting sys-
tems since Florida 2002 have been noted by Dr. Re-
becca Mercuri [9], one of the leading thinkers in the
ﬁeld. And yet the Irish government have committed
to introducing the Nedap/Powervote system for the
whole country at the next general election [10]. This
Dutch/British system appears to have been chosen
without consulting Irish experts in the ﬁeld of com-
puter security. Claims by said experts that the system
may be insecure are often dismissed as paranoia [11]
by both politicians and the public, despite evidence
that elected ofﬁcials do not deserve our unmediated
trust.
It is true that an EVS could offer several advan-
tages over manual systems. It could tabulate the re-
sults more quickly, eliminate the human error which
sometimes occurs in manual vote tabulation, expand
thefranchisetothosecurrentlyunabletovotebecause
of special needs, and improve the fairness of the Irish
count system.
From a traditional standpoint, however, it is ques-
tionable whether or not the Irish electorate needs a
faster count. Many active party members have ex-
pressed their disappointment that they will no longer
be able to enjoy the excitement of a long count. The
anticipation involved in waiting for the result is an in-
tegral part of our political culture [11].
If the system is going to eliminate human error
fromcounting, itmustbedevelopedformally. Human
error in the design or implementation of the count
software might have considerably more serious, and
more far-reaching, effects than human error in the
manual system. Formal development is discussed fur-
ther in the ﬁnal year project report accompanying this
document [12].
2Many people with special needs can currently only
vote with the aid of an election ofﬁcial, which means
that they do not have the same privacy in voting as
other citizens. The potential exists to create a system
accessible to people with visual, auditory, and move-
ment disabilities.
The form of Proportional Representation (Propor-
tional Representation - Single Transferrable Vote –
PR-STV) used in Ireland gives a very accurate rep-
resentation of the will of the people [13]. Unfortu-
nately, this is at the cost of a very complicated count
procedure. One part of the count procedure involves a
compromise between efﬁciency and fairness. Since it
is difﬁcult to determine manually which votes should
be transferred, votes are taken from the top of the pile
– effectively randomly. This does not mean that vot-
ing at a particular time makes your vote more likely
to be transferred – votes are mixed thoroughly at the
beginning of the count process – but it does mean
that the late preferences on some votes are given less
signiﬁcance than others. An electronic system could
fairly determine which votes should be transferred,
removing the need for such a compromise. It is worth
noting that this adjustment could only be made to the
counting procedures if we make it across the whole
system. Which means it could only realistically be
introduced once the electronic system was the main
medium for vote-casting in the country.
It is a commonly held belief that the change from
hand-countedpaperballotstoanEVSisinevitable. In
that case we must examine carefully what we expect
from such a system, and how it should be developed.
We must use all the tools at our disposal to ensure that
the introduction of an EVS does not put the integrity
of our democracy at risk.
Basic Requirements for
a Fair Ballot System
“The goal of any voting system is to establish the in-
tent of the voter, and transfer that intent to the vote
counter.”
– Bruce Schneier, Dec 2000 [14]
Requirements
By developing Mr. Schneier’s statement, we can
present four stages in voting systems.
² Establish who is “the voter”
² Establish the voter’s intent
² Transfer the record of their intent to the vote
counter
² Tabulate the result
These stages have a natural order. There is no point
in establishing the intent of someone who is not au-
thorised to vote, and we cannot count votes which
have not yet been recorded. If each of these stages
is to be carried out satisfactorily, certain requirements
must be met.
Authenticate
We must begin by establishing who “the voter” is.
In most democracies, voting is limited to a particu-
lar group (for example, citizens over 18 years of age),
each of whom is entitled to vote once. To prevent
personation1, we must establish the identity of people
attempting to vote. If someone is successfully iden-
tiﬁed as eligible we must record that they have been
given their opportunity to vote and we must then give
them that opportunity.
Establish Voter Intent
If we are to establish the voter’s own intent, we must
prevent voter coercion and veriﬁable vote sale. We
protect the voter’s privacy so that no-one else can ver-
ify whether they voted the way they were instructed.
As stated above, the voter’s identity must be recorded
so that each voter can vote only once. Their vote,
of course, must also be recorded. In order to pre-
ventconﬂictbetweenthesetworequirementswemust
recordthevoteandidentityseparately, whileensuring
that a vote is only ever recorded for someone who has
been successfully identiﬁed as eligible.
1Curiously, personation is the correct term for impersonation
with intent to fraud.
3Wemustalsoensurethattheinterfaceisadequately
usable to give the voter a fair chance of recording
their vote correctly. It is impossible to develop an
interface which can never be misunderstood but there
are heuristics available to the interface designer [15].
These include using designs already familiar to the
user, and using metaphors which make the interface
more intuitive.
Transfer the Vote
The vote must be transferred from the voter to the
vote counter. It is important that the vote cannot be
altered or removed at this stage, for obvious reasons.
Tabulate the Result
We use the word “tabulate” here, rather than “count”
because count really doesn’t convey the complexity
of the task, especially for the Irish PR-STV system
[13]. Apart from the obvious requirement that the
votes be tabulated correctly, it is vital that the votes
are seen to be tabulated correctly. A voting system
is only as good as the public believe it to be. It must,
therefore, be possible to independently re-tabulate the
results. This last requirement also extends over all the
otherrequirements. Thepubliccannotbesurethatthe
correct result was tabulated if they are not sure that,
for example, all votes were recorded correctly.
Summary
Wenotethattheserequirementsarenotfromthepoint
of view of individual voters, who might prefer to be
able to prove how they voted. They are, rather, from
the point of view of the people as a whole. These are
therequirementswhichmustbemetinordertoensure
that the representatives elected are the representatives
chosen by the people.
To summarise (and please note that order does not
indicate priority):
1. the system must allow only eligible voters to
vote, andtheymustbeallowedtovoteonlyonce,
2. the voter’s identity and their vote must be kept
separate,
3. the voter’s intent must be recorded correctly,
4. the vote cannot be altered or removed once it has
been recorded,
5. tabulation must be accurate and independently
reproducible, and
6. the public must be conﬁdent that all the above
requirements are met.
No voting system can perfectly meet all the above
requirements, but they must be met at least enough to
ensure that fraud is not occurring on a wide enough
scale to alter the result of an election.
Manual System
In the Irish paper ballot system, the voter goes to the
polling station where their vote is registered. If they
are successfully authenticated, they are marked off
the register and at the same time given a valid ballot
paper, fulﬁlling requirement 1. These ‘Australian bal-
lots’ are pre-printed and bear some distinctive mark-
ings that ensure that valid papers are easily distin-
guishable from invalid papers. The voter then indi-
cates their choice and deposits the paper in a ballot
box.
Requirement 2 is achieved with the use of a ballot
paper and ballot box. The ballot paper acts as a kind
of token indicating that the holder has been authen-
ticated, but which gives no clue as to their identity.
The ballot box ensures that the voter’s paper cannot
be viewed by anyone other than the voter himself.
Requirement 3 is met by providing a paper with a
simple and familiar interface. During the vote col-
lection phase, ballot boxes are at all times visible to
polling station staff and interested observers. Their
transport is supervised by members of the Garda
S´ ıochana and representatives of running candidates –
or sides, in a referendum. This means that require-
ment 4 is fulﬁlled because any manipulation of the
ballots would be detected. The tabulation process in-
volves many people, again being supervised closely.
4The ballots are retained so that they can be used in
recounts. The combination of the two fulﬁlls require-
ment 5.
The sixth and ﬁnal requirement is fulﬁlled, again
by the fact that the whole process is supervised. The
familiarity of the electorate with the system, and their
belief that it has worked up until now also contribute
to their conﬁdence.
Remote
Electronic Voting
“A secure Internet voting system is theoretically pos-
sible, but it would be the ﬁrst secure networked appli-
cation ever created in the history of computers.”
– Bruce Schneier, Dec 2000 [14]
Remote electronic voting (REV) refers to any sys-
tem where the user does not have to be in a polling
station in order to register their choice. The most
common proposals for REV envisage voting via the
Internet. But other media, such as mobile phones, are
being considered by the British government and the
European project eucybervote [16, 17].
Technological Problems with REV
Separating Vote and Voter
REV systems must meet the same requirements as
any other voting system. They must authenticate vot-
ers, store their identity, and collect their vote. This
is where the problem of separating voter identity
from vote arises. As Dr. Rebecca Mercuri and Bruce
Schneier have both pointed out [1, 18], voting is dif-
ferent from other secure transactions made on the In-
ternet. For example, ﬁnancial transactions via the
Internet rely on a model where the identities of all
parties are provably linked to the transactions them-
selves. This allows for re-validation of the transac-
tions should their validity be called into question at
a later date. Clearly this model is not suitable in the
case of electronic voting. We must accept votes only
from successfully authenticated voters, but we cannot
attach the voter’s identity to the vote to prove later
that it came from an authenticated voter. As Dr. Mer-
curi says:
“...the privacy constraint directly conﬂicts
with the ability to audit the ballot data.” [1]
Secure Connection
Even if we could surmount this problem by devel-
oping a new model of computer security, there are
other difﬁculties associated with remote vote collec-
tion. The voter’s identity must be transferred from
their device to the authentication server, followed by
their vote. This must be done securely. We cannot
allow malicious observers to view the voter’s identity
and vote (requirement 2), nor can we allow the vote to
be altered or prevented from reaching its destination
(requirement 4).
The connection between the voting device and the
authentication server must be secured, and in practi-
cal terms this means using encryption. This is par-
ticularly true of the Internet, where it is very simple
to observe – and interfere with – other people’s traf-
ﬁc, but it is also true of other media. Individuals or
groups with an interest in affecting the result of an
election, or in knowing how individual voters vote,
may well have the resources to tap into phone lines
– land or mobile – or the technology to view SMS
text messages. However, strong encryption requires
knowledgeable users, since one of the weakest parts
of any cryptosystem is key management [19]. The
greater mass of voters cannot be expected to manage
encryption keys responsibly, so it is likely that any
cryptosystem used in an REV system would have to
trade security for usability.
Viruses and DoS Attacks
Peter Neumann [20] says:
“...the Internet is not safe for elections,
due to its vast potential for disruption by
viruses, denial-of-service ﬂooding, spoof-
ing, and other commonplace malicious in-
terventions.”
5(quoted in Dr. Rebecca Mercuri’s paper “a
Better Ballot Box?” [1])
We have to assume that the majority of voters
are relatively uninformed computer users running un-
patched and virus prone installations of Microsoft
Windows on an Intel machine [8]. It would be easy,
then, for hostile parties to develop a computer virus
to affect the result of an election. Such a virus could
easily be disseminated to the majority of voters, and
if it was designed to have no effect except on vot-
ing software, might never be detected. Douglas Jones
suggests a design for a virus which could affect the
outcome of an election [21]. This virus would al-
ter the voting-interface of a small number of voters.
The number is chosen to be large enough to have an
effect, but not large enough to be obvious. The al-
tered interface would lead the voter to believe that
they had voted for the most popular candidate, when
theyhadactuallyvotedforthecandidatesupportedby
the author of the virus. Other types of viruses might
send the voter’s details along with their vote to some
server, or simply prevent them from voting.
The vote server itself would be in danger of attack.
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are easy to launch,
and can force a server off the network. In 2000 Ya-
hoo was brought down by a DoS attack [22]. If any
hostile individuals or groups wished to disrupt or halt
the election, launching a successful DoS attack on an
election server would serve their purposes well.
Security experts are generally in agreement that re-
mote electronic voting is not safe [14, 23, 24].
Sociological Problems with REV
Apart from the technological problems we have al-
ready discussed, mention must be made of the socio-
logical problems.
Remote voting requires technology. All such tech-
nology costs money. In 2001, only 25% of the Irish
population were using the Internet [25]. If remote
voting were to become the dominant form of voting,
it could result in an increased disenfranchisement of
the poor [26].
One key feature of the polling station is the voting
booth. This is the area where a voter goes to mark
their ballot paper before depositing it in the ballot
box. No-one is allowed to enter the voting booth with
the voter (barring certain circumstances, like special
needs). This provides security against two important
dangers to the integrity of the voting system – voter
coercion and veriﬁable vote sale. When a voter enters
the voting booth, they are alone and unwatched. No-
one can force them to vote in a particular way. Sim-
ilarly, anyone who paid a voter to make a particular
choice would have no guarantee that their investment
had paid off. This is not to say that voter coercion
and vote sale do not occur in Ireland today – they al-
most certainly do. But thanks in part to the voting
booth, they are kept to an acceptable minimum. By
its very nature, remote electronic voting prevents us
from even approximating the safeguard provided by
the voting booth.
Kiosk Voting
“...I will continue to urge municipalities to ONLY
consider the purchase of voting systems that include
a voter-veriﬁed physical audit trail. These systems
would include mark-sense (or optically scanned) pa-
per ballots, or kiosks that produce a paper receipt
that the voter can review and must drop in a box for
recount ...”
– Dr. Rebecca Mercuri [23]
Kiosk voting is the most descriptive term com-
monly used for electronic voting systems in which
the voter must go to some sort of polling station in
order to register their vote. It is spared the remote au-
thenticationproblemswhichplagueremoteelectronic
voting, because the authentication and vote collection
processes can be kept completely separate, connected
only by some token which authenticated voters re-
ceive, and which entitles them to vote. It is recom-
mended that the existing manual authentication pro-
cess used in Ireland – which would not particularly
beneﬁtfromautomation–beusedinconjunctionwith
any EVS introduced here. Requirements 1 (authenti-
6cation) and 2 (privacy) are thus met in the same way
as they are in the paper system. The only difference is
that the ballot paper would be replaced by some simi-
larly difﬁcult to reproduce token which would entitle
the holder to use the voting machine.
The Mercuri Method
Over a decade ago, Dr. Rebecca Mercuri proposed
the Mercuri Method, the use of which would result
in an EVS that met all our other requirements at least
as well as the paper system does. She describes the
method as follows:
“...the Mercuri Method, requires that the
voting system print a paper ballot contain-
ing the selections made on the computer.
This ballot is then examined for correct-
ness by the voter through a glass or screen,
and deposited mechanically into a ballot
box, eliminating the chance of accidental
removal from the premises. If, for some
reason, the paper does not match the in-
tended choices on the computer, a poll
worker can be shown the problem, the bal-
lot can be voided, and another opportunity
to vote provided.” [1]
The EVS could tabulate the results very quickly
from its records, but if there was any doubt about its
results, the paper ballots would be considered the of-
ﬁcial votes. It would be reasonable to implement a
system of spot-checks – where randomly chosen con-
stituencieswouldhavetheirpaperballotscountedand
compared to the electronic result – for the sake of
public conﬁdence. This is the method endorsed by
computer security expert and cryptographer, Bruce
Schneier [14].
Other Measures
However, in the general case, the electronic result
wouldbetakenascorrect. Weshouldtry, therefore, to
ensurethatthesystemitself, withoutthepaperrecord,
meets our requirements.
We must ensure, for the sake of requirement 2
(voter privacy), that the EVS will not provide infor-
mation about the order in which votes were regis-
tered. An observer in the polling station could make
note of the order in which voters entered the booth,
and if the votes were recorded in chronological order
they might then be able to ﬁgure out how individual
voters voted. Technology such as a combination of
pseudo-random number generation and a hashing al-
gorithm might be used for this purpose.
We cannot be sure that a voter’s intent is be-
ing recorded correctly within a completely electronic
system (requirement 3). However, a user interface
that is skillfully designed should improve the voter’s
chances of transferring their intent into the system.
When marking their preferences on paper ballots,
voters sometimes give the same preference to more
than one candidate, or skip a preference (for example
marking preferences 1, 2 and 4). An EVS might pre-
vent the voter from making such mistakes – by only
givingthevotertwooptions: markingtheirnextavail-
able preference or revising their current preferences –
or it might alert them to their mistakes, and give them
the option of revising. This facility cannot be offered
by the manual system without threatening the voter’s
privacy.
If we assume that the vote has been recorded cor-
rectly, we can ensure that it cannot be altered or
removed (requirement 4) by storing the votes in a
medium that can be written to only once.
If the count software is developed formally, we can
be reasonably sure that the votes are tabulated cor-
rectly. This topic is discussed in greater detail in
the ﬁnal year project report accompanying this paper
[12].
The second part of requirement 5 is that the re-
sults can be reproduced independently. To do this we
must refer to the printed ballots – it is unlikely that
an incorrect electronic tabulation of the votes would
be highlighted by rerunning the tabulation software.
As mentioned above, the result of a count can be af-
fected by which ballots are chosen for transferral. So
in order to independently reproduce the same results
we must transfer exactly the same ballots that were
transferred in the electronic tabulation. This requires
7that we print some information the ballot which links
it to the relevant record within the EVS.
And ﬁnally requirement 6 – public conﬁdence. Un-
fortunately, public conﬁdence in the system appears
to be a requirement all too easily met. As will be
discussed in the next section, the Nedap/Powervote
system does not appear to deserve this conﬁdence.
However, any security expert who is not convinced of
the system’s security might be able to shake the pub-
lic’s conﬁdence. Such experts could be made more
conﬁdent if formal methods [27] were used in the de-
velopment of the system, and if all source code and
speciﬁcations were publicly available.
It is the computer science community who have the
expertise to recognise security ﬂaws in an EVS. Any
EVSintroducedinIrelandoughttoconvincethecom-
puter science community that it is safe. Otherwise,
they will be responsible for convincing the general
electorate that the system is – or could be – unsafe.
It should be noted that these measures are adequate
only when combined with the Mercuri Method. We
cannot be fully sure that an electronic voting sys-
tem without ballot paper backup is not displaying
one thing to the voter as their vote, whilst recording
something entirely different. These measures when
properly in place, however, do make the EVS reliable
enough to be worth using as long as we have the pa-
per record. An EVS which does not implement these
measures may be vulnerable to attack from opponents
of electronic voting. If they could make the electronic
results differ from the paper results, they could elim-
inate the use of electronic voting.
Case study: Nedap/Powervote
Therearemanyvotingsystemsinexistencethat could
have been chosen for this case study, but the one of
greatest relevance in Ireland is the system recently
adopted by the Irish government.
The Nedap/Powervote system utilises the existing
manual authentication process to fulﬁll requirements
1 and 2 – voter authentication and privacy – as rec-
ommended. The rest of the Nedap system is less sat-
isfactory, however.
In March 2002 the Department of the Environ-
ment and Local Government (DoELG) requested that
Zerﬂow [28] carry out a security assessment of the
Nedap/Powervote voting machines. The Zerﬂow re-
port [29] which we obtained under the Freedom of
Information Act [30] highlights some serious secu-
rity ﬂaws in the system. The report has not been pub-
lished, and its ﬁndings have been lightly dismissed by
the DoELG [31]. The minister’s statement that
“The concerns raised by the Zerﬂow report
were fully assessed by the Department and
the machine manufacturers.” [31]
is not reassuring. The DoELG presumably have lit-
tle expertise in the area of computer security, and the
manufacturers are unlikely to agree that their system
has ﬂaws.
According to the Zerﬂow report, the interface can
be tampered with. In response, the minister has stated
that
“...the present cover used for the machine
ballot paper is considered adequate.” [31]
The training guide for polling station staff [32] rec-
ommendsthatstaff“occasionallycheckthattheballot
paper/screen has not been interfered with.” There is
no indication of what will happen if it has been inter-
fered with, and if votes may be compromised.
The second major problem identiﬁed by Zerﬂow is
that the backup cartridge is left in the voting machine
after polls close. There is a danger that the backup
will be altered or wiped while still in the machine. If
the primary cartridge is unusable for some reason, it
is vital that the backup cartridge has been kept secure.
The very fact that the voting machine has the ca-
pability to wipe the contents of the backup cartridge
is worrying. Such features should be isolated from
publicly accessible parts of the system. If the system
contains such obviously bad design decisions, what
else might it contain?
Zerﬂow also report that the key which gives polling
station staff access to sensitive features on the ma-
chine is easily copied, and can be ordered by serial
number. The training guide recommends that
8“If there is an occasion (emergency) when
the Control Unit is unattended remove the
key from the unit and give it to the Presid-
ing Ofﬁcer.” [32]
It is easy to conceive of a scenario where a hostile
person or group has acquired a key, and creates a di-
version so that they can gain access to the machine
for 5 minutes.
Although the interface rated highly in an MBRI
survey quoted in [33], gaining a mean rating of ap-
proximately 3.77 out of 4 overall, it is difﬁcult to
gauge the accuracy of this survey, as neither the ques-
tions nor the detailed results are available. Quoted in
the same document, however, are a selection of the
more unfavourable comments, and some of them ap-
pear to be quite serious, for example:
² “Too dark/numbers didn’t light up”,
² “Display/names/photographs too small”, and
² “Numbers too small”. [33]
Since the system does not print out the vote for the
voter’s examination, we have no guarantee that votes
are recorded correctly. To quote Dr. Rebecca Mer-
curi:
“Any programmer can write code that dis-
plays one thing on a screen, records some-
thing else, and prints yet another result.
There is no known way to ensure that this
is not happening inside of a voting system.”
[34]
The source code for the system is not publicly
available. In fact, even the government do not have
a copy. If someone were interested in affecting the
outcome of Irish elections, they might compromise
one of the programmers within Nedap, or manage to
have someone employed there. Skilled programmers
could insert changes which could affect the outcome
of an election, whilst being very difﬁcult to detect.
Opening the source to the general public would make
it much more likely that such changes would be de-
tected.
All of these things do not necessarily add up to an
immediate danger. But even if no malicious person
or group tried to exploit the ﬂaws mentioned, these
ﬂaws do have certain implications about the standard
of design and implementation that went into the cre-
ation of the system. PR-STV is a complicated system,
and it is perfectly realistic to assume that some mis-
takes may have been made in the development of the
count software, especially since the system was not
developed formally. There is no need for malicious
attack on the system; human error in the voting ma-
chine or count software might be enough to give the
wrong result.
Conclusion
“...how many developing nations would trust their
governments or unknown individuals in generally un-
known companies to conduct an election electroni-
cally?”
– Karlin Lillington, Oct 2002 [35]
If a kiosk voting system were developed according
to the principles outlined here, it could offer several
advantages over the manual system. Voters could be
offered the opportunity to correct any mistakes. Tab-
ulation would be faster and more accurate, and could
be made fairer and more people could be given the
chance to vote. Such a system is theoretically possi-
ble, but the Nedap/Powervote system does not reach
a satisfactory standard.
The introduction of electronic voting in Ireland, in
its current form, threatens the integrity of our democ-
racy. As demonstrated in this report, this is an issue
that has been incompetently addressed by the govern-
ment. The cost of the development of a suitable sys-
tem, and whether the potential advantages would jus-
tify that cost, remain undiscussed. It is clear that it is
the responsibility of the computer science community
in Ireland to assess the system being introduced, and
to make itself heard [35].
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